Law and You > Criminal Laws > Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 > General Explanations (S. 3 BNS)

The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023, represents a significant reform of India’s criminal law framework, replacing the colonial-era Indian Penal Code. Among its foundational provisions, Section 3 – General Explanations plays a crucial interpretative role. This section lays down essential rules and definitions that guide how the rest of the statute is to be understood and applied. Section 3 does not create offences or prescribe punishments. Instead, it clarifies how terms, expressions, genders, numbers, and references within the BNS should be interpreted. These explanations ensure uniformity, consistency, and legal certainty in the application of criminal law across courts in India.

By standardizing interpretation, Section 3 prevents ambiguity and reduces the risk of conflicting judicial interpretations. It strengthens the coherence of the BNS and supports the broader objective of modernizing India’s criminal justice system.

General Explanations (S. 3 BNS):

Section 3(1) BNS:

Throughout this Sanhita every definition of an offence, every penal provision, and every Illustration of every such definition or penal provision, shall be understood subject to the exceptions contained in the Chapter entitled “General Exceptions”, though those exceptions are not repeated in such definition, penal provision, or Illustration.

Illustrations:

(a) The sections in this Sanhita, which contain definitions of offences, do not express that a child under seven years of age cannot commit such offences; but the definitions are to be understood subject to the general exception which provides that nothing shall be an offence which is done by a child under seven years of age.

(b) A, a police officer, without warrant, apprehends Z, who has committed murder. Here A is not guilty of the offence of wrongful confinement; for he was bound by law to apprehend Z, and therefore the case falls within the general exception which provides that “nothing is an offence which is done by a person who is bound by law to do it”.

This provision means that every offence defined in the Sanhita, every punishment clause, and every illustration attached to them must be read along with the Chapter on “General Exceptions.” Even if a particular section does not mention those exceptions, they still apply automatically. Objective of this provision is to ensure that all exceptional and extenuating circumstances are integrated into the interpretation of every offence under the Sanhita, thereby avoiding redundancy.

In Prabhu v. Emperor, AIR 1941 All 402 The Allahabad High Court observed that the provisions of Section 6, Penal Code (S. 3(1) BNS), which are that every definition of an offence shall be understood subject to the exceptions contained in the chapter entitled “General Exceptions” though those exceptions are not repeated in such definition.

According to Section 108 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA), when a person is accused of any offence, the burden of proving the existence of circumstances bringing the case within any of the General Exceptions in the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 or within any special exception or proviso contained in any other part of the said Sanhita, or in any law defining the offence, is upon him, and the Court shall presume the absence of such circumstances.

In Shankar Narayan Bhadolkar v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2004 SC 1966 case, the Supreme Court observed that the “general exceptions” contained in Sections 76 to 106 IPC (Ss. 14 to 44 BNS) make an offence a non-offence. The “general exceptions” enacted by IPC (BNS) are of universal application and for the sake of brevity of expression, instead of repeating in every section that the definition is to be taken subject to the exceptions, the Legislature by Section 6 IPC (S. 3(1) BNS) enacted that all the definitions must be regarded as subject to the general exceptions. Therefore, general exceptions are part of definition of every offence contained in IPC (BNS), but the burden to prove their existence lies on the accused.

In Subodh Tewary v. State of Assam, (1987) 1 Crimes 791 on Page 795 case, the Guwahati High Court said that the accused may not take the plea but if the case attracts any of the general exceptions the Court must hold that the accused did not commit any offence.

In Khageswar Pujari vs The State Of Orissa, 1984 (I) OLR 142 case, the Orissa High Court said that Section 6 of the Penal Code stands in the nature of a proviso to Sections 105 and 106 of the Evidence Act (Ss. 108 and 109 BSA)and impose obligation on the Court to consider the cases of exceptions.

Section 3(2) BNS:

Every expression which is explained in any Part of this Sanhita, is used in every Part of this Sanhita in conformity with the explanation.

Words and expressions defined in the BNS are to be used consistently throughout the Sanhita, barring specific exceptions indicated by the context. This aligns with the Roman maxim Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius (the inclusion of one is the exclusion of another). A term used in multiple places must hold the same meaning unless context dictates otherwise.

In Rameshwar Prasad v. Emperor AIR 1931 Nag 177 the Court held that penal status should be strictly interpreted and observed that it is an ordinary canon of construction that word which occurs more than once in the same Act must be given the same meaning throughout the Act unless some definitions in the Act or the context show that the Legislature used the word in different sense.

To understand exception, let us take example that, if a term is defined generally, but a particular section clearly intends a narrower meaning, the specific context will prevail. For example, if “animal” is generally defined to include birds, but a particular offence specifically refers only to “cattle,” then the narrower meaning applies in that section.

Example 1:

According Section 2(26) BNS, “Person” includes any company or association or body of persons, whether incorporated or not. General meaning of the term person is human being but the definition includes company also.

Now Section 318(1) BNS defines the offence of cheating as whoever, by deceiving any person, fraudulently or dishonestly induces the person so deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to consent that any person shall retain any property, or intentionally induces the person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property, is said to cheat.

In this Section, the term “whoever” and ‘person’ includes a company because “person” includes both natural and juristic persons under Section 2(26) BNS. Thus, if XYZ Pvt. Ltd. fraudulently induces customers to part with money, the company itself can be prosecuted, not just its directors.

Example 2:

If a municipal officer accepts a bribe, and another section prescribes punishment for bribery by a public servant, the meaning of “public servant” will be the same everywhere in the Sanhita unless a specific section limits it.

Example 3:

If “document” is defined to include electronic records. Then an offence relating to forgery of a document would also include forging a digital PDF or electronic file. Thus, Courts will not restrict the term only to paper documents.

Vicarious Liability:

Section 3(3) BNS:

When property is in the possession of a person’s spouse, clerk or servant, on account of that person, it is in that person’s possession within the meaning of this Sanhita.

Explanation:

A person employed temporarily or on a particular occasion in the capacity of a clerk or servant, is a clerk or servant within the meaning of this sub-section.

Property in the possession of a person’s spouse, clerk, or servant, on behalf of that person, is considered to be in the person’s possession. Temporary employees also fall under this category.

Example 1:

A gives his gold necklace to his wife for safe keeping at home. If B dishonestly takes the necklace from the wife’s cupboard without consent, it amounts to theft from A. Even though the wife had physical custody, the necklace is considered to be in A’s possession in the eyes of law.

Example 2:

A shop owner hands over ₹50,000 to his cashier (clerk) to deposit in the bank. If someone steals the money from the cashier before deposit, it is treated as theft of the shop owner’s property, because the clerk was holding it on account of the owner.

Example 3:

If A gifts a watch to his wife, and she becomes its owner, then the watch is not in A’s possession. Because, the rule applies only when the spouse, clerk, or servant holds the property on behalf of the person—not when they own it independently.

In H. J. Ranson v. Triloki Nath, AIR 1942 Oudh 318 case, where A had taken a bus on hire purchase from B under the agreement that in case of default B has the right to take back the possession of the bus. A defaulted, and thereupon, B forcibly took the bus from C, who was the driver of the bus. The court ruled that C was in possession on behalf of A; thus, taking the bus from C was taking it out of A’s possession without consent. Court observed that the possession of the servants of the purchaser is possession of their master and they have no power to give any consent with the regard to the property in possession, on behalf of their master. This case is often cited to define the legal boundaries of repossessing property in hire-purchase agreements under Indian law.

Acts Include Illegal Omissions:

Section 3(4) BNS:

In every Part of this Sanhita, except where a contrary intention appears from the context, words which refer to acts done extend also to illegal omissions.

An “act” generally means something voluntarily done by a person. Liability for an omission requires  a legal duty to act, a moral duty to act is not sufficient. An omission is treated like an act only when:

• There is a legal duty to act, and
• The failure to act is intentional or illegal under the law.

This Section, expands the scope of criminal liability to include both actions and failures to act where required by law. The provision ensures that both positive actions (acts) and failures to act (omissions) that violate the law are treated similarly. For example, if a law requires someone to report a crime and they fail to do so, this omission can be considered an illegal act under the Sanhita. This rule applies universally to the provisions of the Sanhita unless a specific section or context indicates otherwise. This creates consistency in interpreting the text.

• Example 1: Suppose a section punishes a public servant who “intentionally aids” an offence. If a police officer, who is legally bound to prevent a crime, deliberately fails to intervene while witnessing it, this illegal omission may amount to aiding. The law treats the omission as equivalent to an act.
• Example 2: If a doctor is legally bound to treat a patient (for example, under contractual or statutory duty) and intentionally refuses emergency treatment, resulting in harm. The harm may be treated as “caused” by the doctor. The offence arises from illegal omission, not a physical act.
• Example 3: A security guard is legally required to lock a warehouse gate at night. If he intentionally leaves it open, enabling theft, his omission can attract liability where the law refers to acts facilitating an offence.
• Example 4: If a passerby sees a stranger drowning but has no legal duty to rescue them, failure to help (though morally wrong) is generally not a criminal omission unless the law specifically imposes such duty.

In Benychandra v. State of West Bengal, 1984 CrLJ 1038 (cal) case, where the accused allowed live A.C. electric wire to remain unprotected and in naked condition and this negligent conduct on the behalf of accused resulted in death of thirteen year old boy. The Court held that the accused was liable to be convicted under S. 304A IPC (S. 106(1) BNS).

They planned it Together:

Section 3(5) BNS:

When a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, each of such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done by him alone.

The provision reflects the principle of joint liability based on common intention. It means that when several persons act together with a shared intention to commit a crime, each person is equally liable for the entire act, even if only one of them actually performs the main act.

The Ingredients of this Section 3(5) BNS are:

• Two or more persons commit the offence;
• There is a common intention;
• The nature of participation is irrelevant; and
• Their participation in the offence is in furtherance of that intention.

• Example 1: A and B plan to kill C. A holds C down. B stabs C. Even though only B used the knife, both A and B are liable for murder, because the act was done in furtherance of their common intention.
• Example 2: A and B decide to rob a shop. A threatens the shopkeeper with a weapon. B collects the money from the counter. Both are equally guilty of robbery, even though B did not threaten anyone and A did not take the money.
• Example 3: A group of three persons (A, B, and C) attack D with the intention of causing grievous hurt. A punches D, B kicks D, and C uses a stick and causes serious injury. All three are liable for the grievous injury, because they acted with a shared intention.
• Example 4: A and B plan a burglary. A enters the house and steals valuables. B stands outside to warn A if anyone approaches. Even though B never entered the house, he is equally liable for the burglary because his act was in furtherance of the common intention.
• Example 5: If A and B are fighting separately with C without any prior meeting of minds, and A suddenly escalates the fight by using a deadly weapon without B’s knowledge, B may not be liable for the more serious offence—because there was no common intention regarding that act.

In Surendra Chauhan v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 2000 SC 1436 case,  a doctor was neither competent to terminate pregnancy nor had the approval of the government. His clinic lacked the basic instruments necessary for the purpose. The victim was taken to that clinic by a person for termination of the pregnancy of the victim and she died in the process. The doctor and the person who took her to the clinic were held liable for the death of the victim as the crime was committed in furtherance of the common intention. In this case, the two accused knew that the clinic did not have the facility for termination of pregnancy and the doctor did not have the competence to complete the procedure without hazard. Still, they concerted and carried on the termination of the pregnancy of the victim. Hence there was the common intention of the two accused to undertake a procedure illegally and in furtherance of their common intention, they subjected the victim to the abortion process as a result of which the victim dies. Hence there was a common intention, an act was done in furtherance of the common intention and each of the two accused participated in the criminal act. One brought the victim to the clinic and the other applied the procedure on the victim.

In Kripal Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1954 SC 706 case, there was a dispute over land between the accused and the victim. One morning the three accused tried to stop labourers from working in the field which the labourers tried to resist. When the victim intervened two accused hit him with sharp weapons. The third accused stabbed the victim with a spear blade which struck the victim in the jaw. The victim died on the spot. The court held that the three accused were liable under S. 326 IPC (S. 118(2) BNS) read with S. 34 IPC (S. 3(5) BNS). However, the third accused alone was liable for murder. The common intention which developed on the spot was to attack the victim with sharp weapons. The other two accused did not intend to murder the victim.

In Barendra Kumar Ghose v King-Emperor, AIR 1924 Cal 545 case, four men attacked the office of the postmaster while he was counting money. Three of them entered the office and demanded the money. Thereafter they opened fire at the postmaster and fled with the money. Appellant who was one of the party was standing outside the office all this time. He was visible from inside and could see what was happening inside.  The defence of the appellant was that he was frightened and he did not participate in the crime and was merely standing outside the office. Lord Summer observed: “the leading feature of s. 34 of the Indian Penal Code (S. 3(5) BNS) is ‘participation’ in action. To establish joint responsibility for an offence, it must of course be established that a criminal act was done by several persons; the participation must be in doing the act, not merely in its planning. A common intention–a meeting of minds–to commit an offence and participation in the commission of the offence in furtherance of that common intention invites the application of s. 34 IPC (S. 3(5) BNS). But this participation need not in all cases be by physical presence. In offences involving physical violence, normally the presence at the scene of the offence of the offenders sought to be rendered liable on the principle of joint liability may be necessary, but such is not the case in respect of other offences where the offence consists of diverse acts which may be done at different times and places.” The Court held that his participation was sufficient to make him vicariously liable for the actions of the other participants in the group. Whether the accused had participated or not has to be decided on the basis of facts surrounding the case.

In Jaikrishnadas Manohardas Desai v. The State of Bombay, AIR 1960 SC 833 case, J M Desai and his co-appellant were the Managing Director and a Director cum technical Expert respectively of a cloth dyeing company Parikh Dyeing and Printing Mills Ltd. The company entered into a  contract with the Textile Commissioner undertaking to dye a large quantity of cloth which was supplied to the company for that purpose. In pursuance of the contract certain quantity of cloth was dyed and delivered to the Textile Commissioner by the company but it failed to dye and deliver the balance of cloth which remained in its possession and was not returned to the Textile Commissioner in spite of repeated demands. Ultimately the two appellants were prosecuted for criminal breach of trust under S. 409 IPC (S. 316(5) BNS) read with S. 34 of the Indian Penal Code (S. 3(5) BNS) and were convicted for the same in a trial by jury. In appeal, the High Court found that the two appellants were liable to account for the cloth over which they had dominion, and having failed to do so each of them was guilty of the offence of criminal breach of trust. In this case, the Court observed: “The essence of liability under S. 34 of the  Indian  Penal Code (S. 3(5) BNS) is the existence of a common intention animating the offenders and the participation in a  criminal act in furtherance of the common intention.  The physical  presence at  the scene of the offence of the  offender  sought  to  be rendered  liable  under S. 34 IPC (S. 3(5) BNS) is not, on the  words  of the statute, one of the conditions of its applicability in every case.”

In Mahboob Shah v. Emperor, AIR 1945 PC 118 case, Allah Dad and few others were trying to collect reeds from the bank of the Indus river. They were warned by Mahboob Shah against collecting reed from lands belonging to him. Ignoring the warning the deceased collected reeds but was stopped by Qasim Shah, nephew of Mahboob Shah while he was placing them on the boat. Qasim Shah was hit by the victim by a bamboo pole. On hearing Qasim Shah’s cries for help, Mahboob Shah and his son Wali Shah came armed with their guns. Wali Shah fired at the victim who died instantly and Mahboob Shah fired at another person causing him some injuries. Lahore High Court sentenced Mahboob Shah with the murder of the victim under s. 302 IPC (S. 103(1) BNS) read with s. 34 IPC (S. 3(5) BNS). But on appeal Privy Council set aside the conviction for murder for Mahboob Shah stating that common intention required pre-arranged plan and it has to be proved that the criminal act was done in concert pursuant to a prearranged plan. Here the two accused might be having the same or similar intention but not the common intention and since the firing of Mahboob Shah did not kill anyone he was not held liable for murder by the application of s. 34 IPC (S. 3(5) BNS).

Each of Them had the Guilty Mind Required for the Offence:

Section 3(6) BNS:

Whenever an act, which is criminal only by reason of its being done with a criminal knowledge or intention, is done by several persons, each of such persons who joins in the act with such knowledge or intention is liable for the act in the same manner as if the act were done by him alone with that knowledge or intention.

This provision ensures that when an act derives its criminality from a guilty mind, every participant who shares that guilty mind is equally responsible, regardless of the specific role played. Criminal liability follows the shared intention or knowledge, not merely the physical act.

Section 3(6) applies when an act is criminal due to its being committed with criminal knowledge or intention. In such cases, each person who joins the act with the same knowledge or intention is held equally responsible, as though they had committed the act alone. However, if individuals involved have differing intentions or knowledge, liability is determined individually based on their specific intent or knowledge.

Key Ingredients of Section 3(6) BNS are:

• The act is criminal because of intention or knowledge.
• Several persons participate in the act.
• Each participant shares the same guilty knowledge or intention.

Section 3(6) thus ensures that liability is proportionate to the individual’s culpable state of mind, unlike Section 3(5), which presumes joint responsibility under a shared intention.

• Example 1: A and B jointly receive a package knowing it contains stolen jewellery. Receiving property is not always criminal — it becomes an offence only when done with knowledge that it is stolen. Since both A and B received it with that knowledge, each is liable as if he alone dishonestly received the stolen property.
• Example 2: A and B jointly submit a false document to obtain a government benefit. Submitting a document is not criminal by itself. It becomes criminal when done dishonestly or fraudulently. If both knew the document was forged and intended to cheat, each is liable as if he alone committed the fraud.
• Example 3: If A knows goods are stolen but B honestly believes they are lawful goods and helps transport them. A is liable but B is not liable under this rule, because B lacked the required criminal knowledge.

In Afrahim Sheikh and Ors. v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1964 SC 1263 case, the Supreme Court clarified that common intention (and by extension, similar knowledge or intention under Section 35) can be established even without prior concert or planning. The crucial test is whether the plan or mental element preceded the act constituting the offence. The Court held that all accused could be held liable if it was proven they acted with the requisite mental state, even if their roles differed.

In Digantha Mudrana vs. B. H. Girish Pai (18 September 2018) case, whre in a business dispute where multiple partners were accused of jointly committing fraud against another party. The court held all partners liable under Section 35 because it was proven that each had knowledge of and participated in the fraudulent scheme. The decision emphasised that joint liability arises when all accused share the requisite knowledge or intention, not merely from their association with the business.

Distinguish between S. 3(5) and 3(6) BNS:

Section 3(5) BNS	Section 3(6) BNS
Section 3(5) corresponds to acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention	Section 3(6) corresponds to act done with criminal knowledge or intention by several persons
Section 3(5) is associated with common intention meaning there must be a prior meeting of minds (which can develop on the spot).	Section 3(6) is associated with same criminal knowledge or intention meaning each accused individually possesses the required intention or knowledge that makes the act criminal.
Section 3(5) creates a principle of joint liability, each person is liable as if he alone committed the act.	Section 3(6) clarifies liability when an act becomes criminal because of intention/knowledge — those sharing that mental state are equally liable.
Section 3(5) requires some form of pre-arranged plan or common design.	Section 3(6) does not require a pre-arranged plan, but requires proof that each participant had the required guilty mind.
Example: A and B plan to kill C. They attack C together. Both are liable for murder because the act was done in furtherance of their common intention.	Example: A and B administer poison to C. If both knew it was poison and intended to cause death, each is liable for murder. If only A knew it was poison, B’s liability depends on his knowledge.

Section 3(7) BNS:

Wherever the causing of a certain effect, or an attempt to cause that effect, by an act or by an omission, is an offence, it is to be understood that the causing of that effect partly by an act and partly by an omission is the same offence.

Illustration:

A intentionally causes Z’s death, partly by illegally omitting to give Z food, and partly by beating Z. A has committed murder.

It means that when an offence consists of causing a particular result (or attempting to cause it), the offence is complete even if that result is caused partly by a positive act and partly by an illegal omission. The law does not distinguish whether the harmful effect was produced entirely by action, entirely by omission, or by a combination of both.

• Example 1: A assaults B and leaves him seriously injured on the roadside. A then deliberately refuses to call for medical help, though he knows immediate aid could save B. The assault (act) causes serious injury. The deliberate failure to seek help (omission) contributes to B’s death. A is liable for causing death. The offence is not reduced merely because death resulted partly from omission.
• Example 2: A parent locks a child in a room (act), and fails to provide food for several days despite a legal duty (omission). If the child dies, the death is caused partly by confinement and partly by starvation (omission). The parent is fully liable for the offence causing death.
• Example 3: A secretly mixes poison in B’s drink (act). Later, when B becomes ill, A prevents others from taking B to hospital (omission). If B dies, the result is caused partly by administering poison and partly by preventing treatment. It is the same offence as if death had been caused purely by one act.
• Example 4: If there is no legal duty to act, the omission part will not count. For example, a stranger who does not rescue someone (without legal duty) does not combine omission with another’s act to create liability.

Implications of Section 3(7) BNS:

• Encourages people to take responsibility: If people know that they will be held responsible for the entire effect caused by their act, they are likely to take steps to prevent harm and to act responsibly in situations where their actions could have negative consequences.
• Ensures accountability: Section 3(7) BNS ensures that people are held responsible for the full extent of the harm they cause, rather than being able to avoid responsibility by claiming that their failure to act was not a direct cause of the harm.
• Reduces harm: Section 3(7) BNS helps to prevent situations where harm is caused by a failure to act and can encourage people to take steps to prevent harm from occurring in the first place.
• Clarifies liability: Section 3(7) BNS helps to ensure that legal decisions are made based on a clear understanding of the circumstances and can help to prevent confusion and ambiguity in legal cases.

In Dr. Mani Kumar Chhetri vs State of West Bengal on 30 June, 2017 case, where  a massive fire broke out in the Annexe-I building of AMRI Hospitals Ltd., Dhakuria, Kolkata in the early hours. The blaze started in the basement and generated toxic smoke, which rapidly spread throughout the multi-storey building. Due to the smoke and poor emergency response, 92 patients admitted in the hospital died from asphyxia/suffocation. Investigation revealed that the basement had been illegally converted into offices, pharmacy and storage for combustible materials like cotton, rubber, wooden items—contrary to sanctioned plans and fire safety directives. Fire safety precautions and systems such as fire stops, automatic smoke detectors, ventilators, or trained fire safety personnel were missing or inadequate despite repeated directives from fire authorities. A hazardous internal policy called “Code Brown” was practiced, where hospital staff were ordered to try to contain fire in-house and delay informing external fire services—aggravating the crisis and delaying professional response. Multiple prior small fire incidents had occurred in the hospital, indicating persistent fire safety lapses. The Court observed “….In cases where an act or illegal omission is committed by several persons with the requisite intention or knowledge which renders it culpable, each individual shall be personally liable for the entire act or illegal omission taken as a whole. Additionally, when the culpable effect is created partly by an act and partly by an omission it shall be understood that they collectively constitute the culpable effect, that is, the offence. …. For the aforesaid reasons, it can prima facie be said that the petitioner is constructively liable for the rash and negligent acts of all the accused persons as if they had been committed by him alone resulting in the death of the victims.”

Section 3(8) BNS:

(8) When an offence is committed by means of several acts, whoever intentionally cooperates in the commission of that offence by doing any one of those acts, either singly or jointly with any other person, commits that offence.

Illustrations:

(a) A and B agree to murder Z by severally and at different times giving him small doses of poison. A and B administer the poison according to the agreement with intent to murder Z. Z dies from the effects the several doses of poison so administered to him. Here A and B intentionally cooperate in the commission of murder and as each of them does an act by which the death is caused, they are both guilty of the offence though their acts are separate.

(b) A and B are joint jailors, and as such have the charge of Z, a prisoner, alternatively for six hours at a time. A and B, intending to cause Z’s death, knowingly cooperate in causing that effect by illegally omitting, each during the time of his attendance, to furnish Z with food supplied to them for that purpose. Z dies of hunger. Both A and B are guilty of the murder of Z.

(c) A, a jailor, has the charge of Z, a prisoner. A, intending to cause Z’s death, illegally omits to supply Z with food; in consequence of which Z is much reduced in strength, but the starvation is not sufficient to cause his death. A is dismissed from his office, and B succeeds him. B, without collusion or cooperation with A, illegally omits to supply Z with food, knowing that he is likely thereby to cause Z’s death. Z dies of hunger. B is guilty of murder, but, as A did not cooperate with B. A is guilty only of an attempt to commit murder.

Key Ingredients of Section 3(8) are:

• The offence is made up of several acts.
• The acts together constitute one offence.
• A person intentionally cooperates by doing any one of those acts.
• That person is liable for the entire offence.

When several persons cooperate in an offence through separate acts, each is held guilty as if they committed the offence themselves.

• Example 1: Counterfeiting involves designing fake notes, printing them, and circulating them. If A designs the fake note, B prints it, and C distributes it. Each is guilty of counterfeiting because each intentionally performed one act forming part of the same offence.
• Example 2: Cheating may involve creating false documents, making false representations, and collecting money from the victim. If A prepares forged documents, B shows them to the victim and makes false claims, and C collects the money. All three are guilty of cheating, even though each performed only one part of the scheme.
• Example 3: If a person unknowingly performs one act without knowledge of the criminal plan, that person is not liable. For example, a printer prints pamphlets believing them to be lawful, but they are actually part of a fraudulent scheme unknown to him. Without criminal intent, he is not guilty.

In State of Maharashtra v. Mohd. Yakub Abdul Razak Memon, AIRONLINE 2013 SC 661 case, the Supreme Court interpreted the scope of Section 37 IPC (S. 3(8) BNS) in cases of conspiracy. In this case, the court held that a person who is part of a conspiracy to commit an offence is liable for the offence committed, even if he does not take any active part in the commission of the offence.  The Court observed that a man may join a conspiracy by word or by deed. However, criminal responsibility for a conspiracy requires more than a merely passive attitude towards an existing conspiracy. One who commits an overt act with knowledge of the conspiracy is guilty. And one who tacitly consents to the object of a conspiracy and goes along with other conspirators, actually standing by while the others put the conspiracy into effect, is guilty though he intends to take no active part in the crime. The court further held that the liability of the accused in a case of conspiracy does not depend on his knowledge of the specific details of the offence. The court stated that it is sufficient if the accused has knowledge of the general nature of the conspiracy and the fact that the conspiracy is likely to result in the commission of an offence.

In Barendra Kumar Ghose v King-Emperor, AIR 1924 Cal 545 case, four men attacked the office of the postmaster while he was counting money. Three of them entered the office and demanded the money. Thereafter they opened fire at the postmaster and fled with the money. Appellant who was one of the party was standing outside the office all this time. He was visible from inside and could see what was happening inside.  The defence of the appellant was that he was frightened and he did not participate in the crime and was merely standing outside the office. The Calcutta High Court held that a person who participates in a crime with the knowledge that the act is likely to result in the commission of an offence is equally liable for the offence committed. The court observed that the liability of the accused in such cases is not limited to the specific act committed by him, but extends to the entire offence.

Distinction between Section 3(5) and Section 3(8) BNS:

Section 3(5) BNS	Section 3(8) BNS
Section 3(5) is applicable to acts done by several persons in furtherance of a common intention.	Section 3(8) is applicable to cases where several persons intentionally cooperate in committing an offence through several acts.
Under Section 3(5), each participant is held liable as if the act was committed by them alone.	Section 3(8), punishes intentional cooperation as though the act itself constituted the offence.
Section 3(5) applies to a single criminal act performed jointly in furtherance of a shared intention.	Section 3(8) applies to several acts, each contributing to the commission of the offence.
Section 3(5) requires common intention among participants to commit the offence.	Section 3(8) requires intentional cooperation, even if the act is done consciously without specific intent.
Under Section 3(5), Liability arises from active participation in the offence committed with shared intention.	Under Section 3(8), liability arises from actions that contribute to the offence, whether singly or jointly, with awareness of their role.
Example: A and B plan to kill C. A holds C down. B stabs C. Even though only B used the knife, both A and B are liable for murder, because the act was done in furtherance of their common intention.	Example: Counterfeiting involves designing fake notes, printing them, and circulating them. If A designs the fake note, B prints it, and C distributes it. Each is guilty of counterfeiting because each intentionally performed one act forming part of the same offence.

Section 3(9) BNS:

Where several persons are engaged or concerned in the commission of a criminal act, they may be guilty of different offences by means of that act.

Illustration:

 A attacks Z under such circumstances of grave provocation that his killing of Z would be only culpable homicide not amounting to murder. B, having ill-will towards Z and intending to kill him, and not having been subject to the provocation, assists A in killing Z. Here, though A and B are both engaged in causing Z’s death, B is guilty of murder, and A is guilty only of culpable homicide.

Section 3(9) allows for different punishments for different offences, unlike Section 3(5), which prescribes a single punishment for a single offence committed in furtherance of a common intention. It addresses situations where individuals involved in a criminal act may be guilty of distinct offences because their actions were carried out without a shared intention.

Conclusion:

Section 3 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 lays the foundational framework for interpreting the provisions of the new criminal code. By providing clear definitions and general explanations, it ensures consistency, clarity, and uniform application of the law across courts in India. Much like interpretative clauses in earlier legislation, this section prevents ambiguity and minimizes conflicting interpretations, thereby strengthening legal certainty. Thus, Section 3 is not merely technical or procedural—it is structural. It supports the entire statutory framework by clarifying key expressions and interpretative principles, thereby promoting fairness, coherence, and effective administration of criminal justice in modern India.

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