Law and You > Criminal Laws > Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 > Chapter III: General Exceptions > Act Done Under Compulsion (S. 32 BNS)

The criminal law generally proceeds on the principle that every individual is responsible for his voluntary acts. However, human conduct is not always the result of free will. Situations may arise where a person commits an offence not out of intention or choice, but under grave and immediate threat to his life. Recognizing such extreme circumstances, the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) incorporates certain general exceptions, one of which is contained in Section 32 BNS, dealing with acts done under compulsion. Duress as a defence in section 32 of the BNS is a fitting representation of legislative intent fluctuating between treating it as an excuse and a justification.

Section 32 BNS provides that an act is not an offence if it is committed under threats that create a reasonable apprehension of instant death. The provision reflects the understanding that the law does not expect a person to display heroic sacrifice when faced with imminent death. At the same time, the section carefully limits this defence by excluding its application to serious offences such as murder and offences against the State punishable with death. It is based on the principle that law does not expect a person to sacrifice his own life in every situation.

Section 32 BNS:

Act to Which a Person is Compelled by Threats:

Except murder, and offences against the State punishable with death, nothing is an offence which is done by a person who is compelled to do it by threats, which, at the time of doing it, reasonably cause the apprehension that instant death to that person will otherwise be the consequence:

Provided that the person doing the act did not of his own accord, or from a reasonable apprehension of harm to himself short of instant death, place himself in the situation by which he became subject to such constraint.

Explanation 1:

A person who, of his own accord, or by reason of a threat of being beaten, joins a gang of dacoits, knowing their character, is not entitled to the benefit of this exception, on the ground of his having been compelled by his associates to do anything that is an offence by law.

Explanation 2:

A person seized by a gang of dacoits, and forced, by threat of instant death, to do a thing which is an offence by law; for example, a smith compelled to take his tools and to force the door of a house for the dacoits to enter and plunder it, is entitled to the benefit of this exception.

Essential Ingredients of Section 32 BNS:

• There must be a threat by another person and the threat must be serious and real, not imaginary;
• The threat must be of immediate death, not future harm at the time of doing the act, and accused was with no other option but to act;
• The threat must be operative at the time of committing the act; and
• The threat must be confined to the person himself.

This doctrine of duress under BNS extends to the BNS as well as special and local laws under S. 2(24) BNS.

The provision exempts a man from criminal liability in respect of an act committed under compulsion or duress that reasonably causes the apprehension of death to that person. This is founded on the well-known Maxim: “Actus me invito factus est nisi actus” which means an act which is done by me, against my will is not my act, and hence I am not responsible for it.

Exceptions to Section 32 BNS:

• Murder punishable with death; (a man cannot kill another to save his own life, but the one who abets the murder or helps in disappearing the evidence is read under S. 32 BNS for the defence)
• Waging a war against the state or government of India, punishable with death (Only one which is punishable by death under BNS is under S. 147, the defence is not available to any under law because it presumes that ―an individual should not place the sovereignty of his country, even above his life.

Case Laws on Act Done Under Compulsion (S. 32 BNS):

Regina v. Hudson & Taylor [1971] 2 QB 202

In this case, where two teenage girls, Hudson (17) and Taylor (19), were prosecution witnesses in a trial involving a violent assault. The accused in that case had allegedly attacked another person with a razor. While giving evidence in court, the girls refused to identify the accused despite earlier statements to the police implicating him. It was later revealed that they had been threatened by associates of the accused with serious violence if they testified. The threats were not carried out immediately inside the courtroom, but the girls feared retaliation afterward. They were charged with perjury for knowingly giving false evidence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the defence of duress. The court held that immediacy does not require the threat to be carried out instantly. The important test is whether the accused reasonably believed: the threat was real and serious; the threat would be carried out; and they had no safe avenue of escape. The court recognized that young witnesses may reasonably fear violent retaliation even if police protection was theoretically available. This case expanded the understanding of duress in English law.

R v Hasan [2005] UKHL 22

In this case, where Hasan was involved in handling stolen cheques and had associations with criminals. He began working for a man named Sullivan, who was engaged in criminal activities. Hasan claimed that Sullivan forced him to commit a burglary by threatening violence pleading that he was blackmailed into committing the burglary to prevent his family from being harmed. He argued that he acted under duress, fearing serious harm if he refused. At trial, the judge left the defence of duress to the jury, and Hasan was acquitted. The prosecution appealed. The House of Lords allowed the prosecution’s appeal and significantly restricted the defence of duress. Key principles laid down in the case are:

• Voluntary Association Rule: A person cannot rely on duress if he voluntarily joins a criminal enterprise where he foresaw, or reasonably should have foreseen, the risk of being subjected to threats.
• Objective Test: The court emphasized a stricter objective standard in assessing foreseeability.
• Immediacy Requirement: The threat must be imminent or almost immediate. There must be no safe avenue of escape.
• Burden of Proof: The defendant must raise sufficient evidence for duress before it can be considered by the jury.

The case overruled or narrowed the liberal approach taken in R v Hudson and Taylor (1971). It reinforced strict limits on the defence of duress. It emphasized personal responsibility where a person knowingly associates with criminals. Though an English case, it is frequently discussed in relation to Section 94 of the Indian Penal Code (S. 32 BNS).

sanlaydo v. Emperor, AIR 1933 Rang 204

In this case, where the accused willingly joined the gang of robbers took wine and started to commit robbery. They reached to the shop of accused’s master. The accused refused to commit robbery. The other accused threatened him to death if he did not join the robbery. The Court held that the accused is not entitled to the benefit of Section as he himself placed in the situation by which he became subject to the compulsion.

Distinguish between S. 19 and S. 32 BNS:

Section 19 BNS	Section 32 BNS
It is based on the principle of necessity and choosing the lesser evil to prevent a greater one	It is based on the principle of compulsion (duress).
There is no threat.	There is a threat from a person.
Under this Section, the accused does an act likely to cause harm.	Under this Section, the accused commits an offence under threat
It is done without criminal intent.	In this case, the accused faces reasonable apprehension of instant death
Accused does the act in good faith to prevent a greater harm.	Accused has no reasonable way to escape
It is applicable in certain limited cases.	It is not applicable to murder and waging a war against the state or government of India
Example: If a small child is locked in a house, if someone break open the door to rescue the child has not committed a crime.	Example: A person seized by a gang of dacoits, and forced, by threat of instant death, to do a thing which is an offence by law; for example, a smith compelled to take his tools and to force the door of a house for the dacoits to enter and plunder it, is entitled to the benefit of this exception.

Conclusion:

Section 32 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 represents a carefully crafted exception to criminal liability, acknowledging that human conduct is not always the product of free and voluntary choice. When a person acts under the shadow of an immediate threat of death, the law recognizes that self-preservation may overpower ordinary moral judgment. By providing protection in such extreme circumstances, Section 32 BNS reflects compassion and realism within the criminal justice system.

At the same time, the provision is deliberately narrow. The requirement of a threat of instant death, the absence of a safe avenue of escape, and the express exclusion of murder and certain offences against the State demonstrate that the law does not permit this defence to be used lightly. The balance struck by Section 32 BNS ensures that while human frailty is acknowledged, public safety and moral accountability remain paramount.