Law and You > Administrative Law > Personal Bias
According to the ‘Lectric Law Library’s Lexicon, “Any mental condition that would prevent a judge or juror from being fair and impartial is called bias. A particular influential power which sways the judgment; the inclination or propensity of the mind towards a particular object. It may be ground for disqualification of the judge or juror in question.”. Bias is also defined as, “A predisposition or a preconceived opinion that prevents a person from impartially evaluating facts that have been presented for determination; a prejudice.” In this article, we shall discuss personal bias.
If a judge or adjudicating authority is biased either in favour of one party or against the other, he cannot be expected to do justice in the matter. Such a person is disqualified from adjudicating and since such proceedings stand vitiated, any decision taken by him is liable to be set aside. This basic rule applies to all judicial authorities as well as to all administrative authorities who are required to act judicially or quasi-judicially. The rule is of wide application and means that a judicial or quasi-judicial authority should not only himself not be a party but must also not be interested as a party in the subject matter of the dispute which he has to decide.
Thus, in addition to the direct personal interest, the test laid down by the court is to consider the real likelihood of bias. In other words, the probability of bias is sufficient to invalidate the right to sit in judgment and there is no need to have the proof of actual bias. Bias can be categorized into three categories namely personal, pecuniary, and official.
Personal Bias:
Personal bias may arise out of friendship, relationship, professional grievance or even enmity. Here again likelihood of bias is to be given more credence than for the actual bias. it is difficult to prove the state of mind of a person. Therefore, we have to see whether there is a reasonable ground for believing that he was likely to have been biased.
In order to challenge an administrative action successfully on the ground of personal bias, it is essential to prove that there is a “reasonable suspicion of bias” or a “real likelihood of bias”. The “reasonable suspicion test looks mainly to outward appearance, and the “real likelihood” test focuses on the court’s own evaluation of possibilities.
In R v. Handley, (1921) 61 DLR 585 case, a magistrate who has been beaten by the accused is disqualified from hearing a case filed against the accused person.
In Cottle Vs. Cottle, (1939) All ER535 case, the Chairman of the Bench was a friend of the wife’s family who had instituted matrimonial proceedings against her husband. The wife had told the husband that the Chairman would decide the case in her favour. The Divisional Court ordered a rehearing.
In R. v. Hoscasan, (1811) 14 East 605 case, it was held that the magistrate cannot convict his own employee for a breach of contract on the complaint filed by the bailiff of the Magistrate.
In West End Service v. I.T. Council, (1958) 11 DLR 364 case, the proprietor of a garage made an application to the council for exempting him from a by-law requiring to close his garage early. The application, however, was turned down by the council. Three councilors happened to be competitors in the business. The Council’s decision was set aside as such.
In Meenglass Tea Estate v. Workmen, AIR 1963 SC 1719 case, the manager himself conducted an inquiry against a workman for the allegation that he had beaten up the manager. Held that the inquiry was vitiated.
In Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India, AIR 1987 S C 2386 case, the applicant Ranjit Thakur, a Signal Man, had been imprisoned for 28 days by the Commanding Officer for representing against ill-treatment at the hands of the Commanding officer (the same man). When in prison he is said to have refused to take food despite an order by the Orderly Officer of the same regiment. He was dismissed and sentenced to one year of rigorous imprisonment. The same Commanding Officer was a member of the Court Martial tribunal. The Army Act, Section 130, requires that at the opening of the trial, names of presiding officers would be read, and the accused would be asked as to whether he objects to being tried by any of the members. The remaining members of the tribunal would decide on the objection. The tribunal did not seek the objection of the accused. Supreme Court held that the question of the choice and quantum of punishment is within the jurisdiction and discretion of the Court- Martial. But the sentence has to suit the offence and offender. It should not be vindictive or unduly harsh. It should not be so disproportionate to the offence as to shock the conscience and amount in itself to conclusive
In Ladies of the Sacred Heart of Jesus v. Armstrong, (1961) 29 DLR 373 case, the Court held that a decision of a tribunal can be set aside if its Chairman is the husband of an executive officer of the body which is a party before the tribunal.
In Tata Motor Challenge v. Government of West Bengal, on the constitutional validity of the Singur Land Rehabilitation and Development Act, Justice Saumitra Pal recused himself from the case, citing that he knew some of the people in relation with the case personally.
Personal animosity will vitiate the order. In B. H. Kalyani v. Air France Calcutta, AIR 1963 SC 1756 case, Where an enquiry was conducted by an officer against whom the delinquent employee had earlier given evidence in a criminal proceeding was held incompetent to hold a disciplinary enquiry.
In Vassiliades v. Vassiliades case, the Court held that a judgment which is the result of bias or want of impartiality is a nullity and the trial ‘coram non judice’ (Latin for “not before a judge”).
In Ramanand Prasad Singh v. Union Of India, 1996 SCC (4) 64 case, the court held that one of the members of the panel of selection committee his brother was a candidate in the competition but due to this, the whole procedure of selection cannot be quashed.
In Baidyanath Mahapatra v State of Orissa, AIR1989 SC 664 case, the supreme court quashed the order of the tribunal confirming premature retirement on the ground that the chairman of the tribunal was also a member of the review committee which had recommended premature retirement.
In Javid Rasool Bhat v. State of Jammu and Kashmir, (1984) 2 SCC 631 case, admission to medical college was challenged on various grounds. One of the grounds was that the Principal of a medical college was a member of the Selection Committee, although his own daughter was one of the candidates for admission. It was, however, shown that this member had informed the Selection Committee at the very outset about this fact and he would have nothing to do with her written test and the marks obtained by this candidate were not known when she was being interviewed and that, a result of her performance at the interview, she lost, rather than gained, some places. In the circumstances, the Supreme Court held that there was no likelihood of bias.
A. K. Kripak v. Union of India AIR 1970 SC 150 case:
In 1966, the Indian forest service was constituted, the selection for which was to be made from among the officers serving in the forest department of the State. The rule made under Section 2(A) of the All India Services Act, 1951 by the Central Government provided for setting up of a Special Selection Board whose function would be to recommend officers for selection to the central service and it was to be headed by the chief conservator of forest of that state. The final selections were to be made by the UPSC.
In the state of Jammu & Kashmir, one Naquishbund was appointed as acting chief conservator of forest and hence was appointed as the ex-officio chairman of the Selection Committee. Two persons senior to him had been superseded and they had filed petitions against this to higher authorities regarding this. Meanwhile, the selection committee had to recommend names and it so happened that they recommended the names of the person in which Naquishbund was included but excluding the two senior officers who had been superseded, who were all candidates to the Indian forest service. The recommendations of the Board were submitted to the UPSC.
The recommendation was challenged on the ground that a person who had been recommended was the chairman of the board and that it had violated the requisites of fair hearing and apparently violated the principles of natural justice.
The Supreme Court struck down the selection and held that a person who sits on a Committee for selection of candidates for a certain job must not be a candidate himself for the Job. The logic is that Judges could be impartial and neutral. He must be free from any controversy, suspicion of bias in rendering Justice. Court also opined that the administrative authorities also ought to comply with certain rules and principles of natural justice to lend credence to his decision.
Related Topics:
- Introduction to Principles of Natural Justice
- First Principle of Natural Justice: Nemo debet esse judex in propria causa
- Pecuniary Bias and Subject Matter Bias
- Second Principle of Natural Justice: Audi Alterem Partem
- Third Principle of Natural Justice: Speaking Order
- Exceptions to the Principle of Natural Justice