Law and You > Criminal Laws > Indian Penal Code > Person (S. 11 IPC)
In the last article, we have studied Sections 8-10 of the IPC which define Gender, Number, and man and woman respectively. When reading the code Chapter II on General Explanation and Chapter IV on General Exceptions are very important. Acceptance of satisfactory terminology is of the first importance for securing workable rules. The law must have the same meaning for all persons. All Acts contain an interpretation clause that defines and explains the leading terms used in the Act to avoid any mistake of meaning. It is necessary that a word that occurs more than once in the same Act must be given the same meaning throughout the Act. In this article, we shall study Section 11 of IPC, which defines the term ‘Person”
Section 11: Person:
The word “person” includes any Company or Association or body of persons, whether incorporated or not.
The definition of the word ‘person’ in Section 11 of the Code uses the word ‘include’. thus besides the clear meaning of the word person additional meaning given in the section to be attributed to it.
In Jabbar v. State, AIR 1966 All 590 case, The Court observed: “The word ‘person’ includes any company or association or body of persons whether incorporated or not. This is hardly a definition. It seems to be only an indication of the intention of the legislature to use the word “person” in a fairly wide sense so as to include even artificial persons. The word person is said to be derived from “persona” which stood for the mask worn by an actor on the stage amongst the ancient Greeks and Romans. In law, it implies the juristic personification of an entity which may or may not be an animate being.
In Jabbar v. State, AIR 1966 All 590 case Jabbar and Sanju have some issues due to their work agreement. Jabbar slapped Sanju. In the evening, Jabbar and his brothers went to Sanju’s house looking for Sanju. There they pushed Smt. Pangoli wife of Jamna, the brother of Sanju and kicked her on a side of her stomach. As a result, Smt Panguli, who was pregnant, was taken ill and gave birth prematurely to a seven-month-old baby which died. The question before the court was that whether the seven-month unborn child can be considered a person or not. The Court held that the term “Person” will also include a child whether born or unborn. Even if the child is unborn and within the womb of the mother, it is capable of being spoken as a “person”, if its body is developed sufficiently to make it possible to call it a child.
Crime Committed by Corporate or Corporation as a Person:
An incorporated company is a juristic person and can be guilty of an offence under the code.
In State of Maharashtra v. Syndicate Transport Company ( 1964(2) Cri LJ 276) case the Bombay High Court observed that a corporate body cannot be indicted for offences like treason, murder, bigamy, perjury, rape, etc. which can only be committed by human individuals, or for offences which are compulsory punishable with imprisonment and held that a body corporate ought to be indictable for criminal acts or omissions of its directors or authorized agents or servants, whether or not they involve mens rea.
Standard Chartered Bank Case (Land Mark Judgement):
Before this case, Indian Courts were of the opinion that corporations cannot be criminally prosecuted for offences that involve mandatory imprisonment and requiring mens rea as one of the essential ingredients. In the Assistant Commissioner, Assessment – II, Banglore v. Vellappa Textiles Ltd., 2004 SCC (Cri) 1214 case, the prosecution was launched against the respondent, a private limited company, for the offences punishable under Sections 276C, 277, and 278 read with Section 278B of the Income Tax Act, 1961. Under Section 276C and 277, the sentence was imprisonment and fine. The Court held that the company cannot be prosecuted for offences which require the imposition of a mandatory term of imprisonment coupled with a fine. It was further held that where punishment provided is imprisonment and fine, the court cannot impose only a fine.
In Standard Chartered Bank v. Directorate of Enforcement, AIR 2005 SC 2622 case, on receipt of notices under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 for showing cause why adjudication proceedings for imposition of penalty under Sections 50 and 51 of the FERA be not initiated against the appellant bank and some of its officers and further notices under Section 61 of the FERA giving an opportunity to the first appellant bank and its officers of showing that they had the necessary permission from the concerned authority for the transaction involved. The appellant bank filed Writ Petition seeking a declaration that the relevant sections of the FERA are unconstitutional, being violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India and for writs of prohibition restraining the authorities under the FERA from proceeding with the proposed adjudication and the proposed prosecution, in terms of the Act. The High Court of Bombay rejected the challenge to the constitutional validity of Sections 50, 51, 56 and 68 of the FERA, but clarified that Section 68(1) of the FERA was not applicable to an adjudication proceeding and that it was confined to prosecution for penal offences under the Act. Being aggrieved, the appellant bank and its officers have filed a Civil Appeal in the Apex Court. The judgment of the Apex Court overruled, judgment in the Vellappa Textiles Ltd. Case by the majority of 3:2. The majority view was that there is no immunity to the companies from prosecution merely because the prosecution is in respect of offences for which the punishment prescribed is mandatory imprisonment. As the company cannot be sentenced to imprisonment, the Court cannot impose that punishment, but when imprisonment and fine is the prescribed punishment the Court can impose the punishment of fine which could be enforced against the company. Such discretion is to be read into the Section viz., S. 56 of Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (1973) (FERA) and Ss. 276-C and 278-B of Income-tax Act (1961) so far as the juristic person is concerned. Of course, the Court cannot exercise the same discretion as regards a natural person. As regards company, the Court can always impose a sentence of fine, and the sentence of imprisonment can be ignored as it is impossible to be carried out in respect of a company. This appears to be the intention of the Legislature. It cannot be said that there is blanket immunity for any company from any prosecution for serious offences merely because the prosecution would ultimately entail a sentence of mandatory imprisonment. The corporate bodies, such as a firm or company undertake series of activities that affect the life, liberty, and property of the citizens. Large-scale financial irregularities are done by various corporations. The corporate vehicle now occupies such a large portion of the industrial, commercial, and sociological sectors that amenability of the corporation to criminal law is essential to have a peaceful society with a stable economy. Thus, because the company cannot be sentenced to imprisonment, the Court has to resort to punishment of imposition of fine which is also a prescribed punishment. As per the scheme of various enactments and also the Indian Penal Code, a mandatory custodial sentence is prescribed for graver offences. If the contrary view is accepted, no company or corporate bodies could be prosecuted for the graver offences whereas they could be prosecuted for minor offences as the sentence prescribed therein is custodial sentence or fine. The intention of the Legislature is not to give complete immunity from prosecution to the corporate bodies for these grave offences. Consequently, even for offences under S. 56(1)(i), FERA Act, the company could be prosecuted. It is sheer violence to common sense that the Legislature intended to punish the corporate bodies for minor and silly offences and extended immunity of prosecution to major and grave economic crimes.
Conclusion:
In Mayor of Portsmouth v. Smith, the Court observed: “the introduction of interpretation clause is a novelty.” When the act itself provides the dictionary for the words used, the court must first look into that dictionary for interpretation. When the word defined contains ‘include’ in the meaning, the definition is extensive in nature. In the case of an extensive definition, the definition of the word has the scope and ambit to go beyond what has been stated and it also gives the scope to interpret and incorporate as to what all can be included in that definition. The word ‘include’ is very generally used in the interpretation clause in order to enlarge the meaning of words or phrases occurring in the body of the statute, and when it is so used those words or phrases must be construed as comprehending, not only such things, as they signify according to their natural import, but also those things which the interpretation clause declares that they shall include. The plain meaning of the word ‘person’ is a human being but Section 11 attributes additional meaning to the word ‘person’. Under this section, any Company or Association or body of persons, whether incorporated or not must be included in the meaning of the word ‘person’ for the purpose of the Code.