Law and You > Legal Concepts > Human Rights > Fundamental Rights of Prisoners
Fundamental rights are the basic rights of the citizens which cannot be taken away under any circumstances. In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597 case, speaking about the importance of fundamental rights Bhagwati J. observed: “These fundamental rights represent the basic values cherished by the people of this country since the Vedic times and they are calculated to protect the dignity of the individual and create conditions in which every human being can develop his personality to the fullest extent. They weave a “pattern of guarantee” on the basic structures of human rights and impose negative obligations on the State not to encroach on individual liberty in its various dimensions.” In this articles we shall study constitutional and statutory provisions regarding the fundamental rights of prisoners.
The conviction of a human does not render him non-human. He still remains a human who should be treated like one. He should be given the basic human /fundamental rights available to every man walking on the earth. But his freedom should be subject to certain limitations and reasonable legal restrictions. Giving prisoners Right to Fair procedure forms the soul of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Thus the convicts are not by mere reason of their conviction deprived of all the fundamental rights which they otherwise possess. Thus, a prisoner is entitled to all his fundamental rights unless his liberty has been constitutionally curtailed.
The Constitution of India under Part III provides for the protection of fundamental rights of the prisoner. Besides the Constitution there are certain statutes like the Prisons Act, 1894, Prisoners Act 1900, Prisoners (Attendance in Court) Act, 1955, the Probation of Offenders Act 1958 and Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, where rights are conferred to the prisoners. Prisons and Police Manuals which also have certain rules and safeguards for the prisoners and cast an obligation on the prison authorities to follow these rules.
Constitutional Provisions for Fundamental Rights of Prisoners:
Constitution of India is the supreme law of India. All other laws must conform to the provisions of the Constitution, otherwise they will be unconstitutional. Article 21 guarantees protection of life and personal liberty. Article 14 in which principle of equality is embodied states that the state shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India. Some of the freedoms guaranteed under Article 19, such as freedom of speech and expression, freedom of association etc. can be enjoyed by the prisoner even behind the bars and his imprisonment or sentences has nothing to do with these freedoms, of course, within the limitations of the prison rules.
In Charles Shobraj v. The Suptd., Central Jail, Tihar AIR 1978 SC 1514 case, Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer observed that imprisonment does not spell farewell to fundamental rights although, by a realistic re-appraisal, Courts will refuse to recognize the full panoply of part III enjoyed by free citizens. Further, observed that the axiom of prison justice is the Court’s continuing duty and authority to ensure that the judicial warrant which deprives a person of his life or liberty is not exceeded, subverted or stultified. It is a sort of solemn covenant running with the power to sentence. Referring to the decision of Supreme Court in Rustom Cowvasjee Cooper v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 1318, and Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597 cases, it was observed that Prisoner’s retain all rights enjoyed by free litigants except those lost necessary as an incident of confinement, the rights enjoyed by prisoner’s under Article 14, 19 and 21 though limited, are not static and will rise to human heights when challenging situation arise.
In the case of T.V. Vatheeswaran v. State of Tamil Nadu 1983 AIR 361 case, it was held that the rights guaranteed in Article 14, 19, and 21 are available to prisoners as well as freemen. The walls of prison cannot keep out the fundamental rights
In Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration, (1980) 3 SCC 488 case, the Apex Court observed “Prisons are built with stones of law”, and sort behoves the Court to insist that, in the eye of law, prisoners are persons, not animals and punish the deviant “guardians” of the prison system where they go berserk and defile the dignity of the human inmate. Prison houses are part of Indian earth and the Indian Constitution cannot be held at bay by Jail officials “dressed in a little, brief although when Part III is invoked by a convict. For when a prisoner is traumatized, the constitution suffers a shock. The Supreme Court further held that the Court has power and responsibility to intervene and protect the prisoner against may how, crude behaviour.
Article 20(1) protects the persons from “ex post facto laws.” This Article provides to protect a prisoner from being subjected to any punishment which was not authorized by law at the time when he committed the alleged act and to which he was convicted and sentenced after the trial then provided under the law.
In other words no imprisonment conditions harsh labour can be enacted and inflicted on him who was not prescribed by the law at the time; he committed the crime for which the imprisonment in question was imposed.
In Chief Inspector of Mines v. Karan Chand Thapar, AIR 1961 SC 838 case, where the rule made applicable from 1st July 1961 was published in a Gazette of 7th July 61. The Court held that if an act is not an offence at the date of the commission, no future law can make it an offence and ordered that the rule cannot be applicable in respect of acts committed before 7th July 1961.
In Soni Devrajbhai Babubhai v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1991 SC 2173 case, where Section 394(B) IPC was inserted in the Code on 19th November 1986 creating a distinct offence of dowry death and providing a minimum sentence of seven years imprisonment. The Court held that this provision does not apply to the death caused before the insertion of the section.
In Rattan lal v. State of Punjab, AIR 1965 SC 444 case, where, the appellant, committed house trespass and tried to outrage the modesty of a girl aged 7 years. By an order dated May 31, 1962, he was convicted by magistrate and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment. He was also ordered to pay fine. At the time of his conviction, he was 16 years old. The Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 was extended to the State of Punjab on September 1, 1962 and hence at the time of his conviction the magistrate had no power or duty to make any order under the Act. The appeal of the appellant was dismissed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Gurgaon by his order dated September 22, 1962. His revision petition was also dismissed by the High Court on September 27, 1962. No ground was taken either before the Additional Sessions Judge or High Court that the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 should be applied in the case. After the dismissal of the revision petition, appellant filed a criminal miscellaneous petition requesting the High Court to exercise its powers under s. 11 of the Act and pass orders under sections. The High Court refused to pass such order under the Act. A special leave petition was filed in the Supreme Court. The question for determination was whether an appellate court could apply the Act had come into force? The Supreme Court by a majority of two to one answered the question in affirmative. Subba rao J. who delivered the majority opinion, concluded that in considering such petitions, the rule of beneficial construction required that even an ex post facto law of the type involved in that case be applied to reduce the punishment.
Double Jeopardy is a legal term and it means that a person cannot be punished for the same offense more than once. According to Article 20(2) no person shall be prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than once. This Article is based on maxim nemo debet bis vexari means a man shall not be brought into danger for one and the same offence more than once. This principle is enacted in Section 26, General Clauses Act, 1897, and Section 300 CrPC. Departmental and administrative authorities are excluded from this provision of double jeopardy and only proceedings which are made before judicial courts and judicial tribunals are considered for applying the doctrine of double jeopardy.
In Maqbool Hussain v. State of Bombay, AIR 1953 SC 325 case, the appellant Maqbool Hussain, a citizen of India arrived at an airport of Santa Cruz from a place from abroad. Upon his landing, he did not declare that he has brought gold from abroad. However on search it was discovered that he brought 107.2 tolas of gold which was in contravention to government notification dates August 25, 1948. Action was taken against the appellant by the custom authorities and the gold was thereafter confiscated. Later the appellant was prosecuted by the criminal court under the Foreign exchange Regulation Act. The question before the Supreme Court was whether the plea of autrefois acquit be raised under Art 20(2) of the Indian Constitution or not. The Supreme Court in this case concluded that the proceedings made before any custom authorities does not constitute ‘prosecution’ of appellant and the penalty imposed by such authorities does fall within the category of ‘punishment’ as under Art 20(2) of Constitution of India. It was therefore said that in this case where the case was first presented under custom authorities and then before the criminal court does not constitute as second trial and Article 20 does not act as a bar on second trial. The Supreme Court therefore pronounced that It is clear that in order that the protection of Art. 20 (2) be invoked by a citizen there must have been a prosecution and punishment in respect of the same offence before a court of law or a tribunal, required by law to decide the matters in controversy judicially on oath which it must be authorized by law to administer and not before a tribunal which entertains a department or an administrative enquiry even though set up by a statute but not required to proceed on legal evidence given on oath. The very wording of Art 20 and the words used therein would indicate that the proceedings therein contemplated are of the nature of criminal proceedings before a court of law or a judicial tribunal and the prosecution in this context would mean an initiation or starting of proceedings of a criminal nature before a court of law or a judicial tribunal in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the statute which creates the offence and regulated the procedure.
One of the important safe guards which is useful for under trial and detenue is provided in Article 20(3). It is protective umbrella against testimonial compulsion in respect of persons accused of an offence to be witness against themselves. This protection, as the language goes, is not confined to evidence before Court but would even cover stage prior to it like investigation subsequent to becoming accused of an offence. The protection is available not only in respect of evidence given in a trial before Court but also at previous stage. The guarantee of Article 20 (3) is available only to the person accused of an offence. A person would become accused if an F.I.R. has been lodged against him or a complaint has been made or formal accusation has been made which in normal course would result in prosecution. This right to silence is not limited to the case for which the person is being examined but further extends to other matters pending against him, which may have the potential of incriminating him in other matters. It was also held that the protection could be used by a suspect as well.
In Nandini Satpathy v. P.L Dani, AIR 1978 SC 1025 case, the appellant, a former Chief Minister of Orissa was directed to appear at Vigilence Police Station, for being examined in connection to a case registered against her under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 and under S. 161/165 and 120-B and 109 of The Indian Penal Code, 1860. Based on this an investigation was started against her and she was interrogated with long list of questions given to her in writing. She denied to answer and claimed protection under Article 20(3). The Supreme Court ruled that the objective of Article 20(3) is to protect the accused from unnecessary police harassment and hence it extends to the stage of police investigation apart from the trial procedure.
The protection against self-incrimination envisaged in Article 20 (3) is available only when compulsion is used and not against voluntary statement, disclosure or production of document or other material. Thus the jail authorities or police authorities cannot compel the prisoners to give the testimony which is likely to expose them for the criminal consequences. It is the duty of the prosecution to prove the case beyond reasonable doubts.